Towards Decarbonising Transport | 2026

In addition to changes in the relevance of the G20 at the global level, shifts are also occurring within the group itself. In 2015, the G7 (comprising Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) were responsible for half of the group’s GDP. A decade later, the group represented 45 % of the G20’s GDP – a five percentage point drop, despite collective GDP growth of 18 % (see Figure 2). During this period, the BRICS+ group (consisting of Brazil, China, Russia, India, Indonesia and South Africa) increased their GDP by 51 %, raising their GDP share in the G20 from 40 % to 45 %. Growth within the BRICS+ group is mainly driven by growth in China and Indonesia.

1.2 Slower growth in transport emissions

Global greenhouse gas emissions from transport dropped significantly during the pandemic, but started to increase again in 2021. By 2024, emissions had reached pre-pandemic levels, although growth slowed down that year. Compared to 2015, global emissions from the sector have increased by 7 %, which is much lower than in previous decades, which saw growth rates of 26 % (1995–2004) and 15 % (2005–2014). 
 

Global GDP increased by 31 % between 2015 and 2024, growing much faster than emissions from the transport sector. This indicates a slow decoupling of economic development from transport emissions, even if some of the slowdown in emissions growth is likely attributable to the pandemic (see Figure 3).

Transport emissions in the G20 countries increased by 4 % over the past decade, with growth remaining below global levels. Consequently, the group’s share of global emissions in transport has fallen slightly, from 69 % to 67 %. Nevertheless, compared to 1990, when the G20 were responsible for nearly three-quarters of global transport emissions, the decline is substantial.

Transport emissions in Africa (excluding South Africa) have increased the most, experiencing a 26 % rise between 2015 and 2024, although from very low starting levels. Over the past decades, transport emissions in Africa and the rest of the world (excluding the G20) have seen a disproportionate increase, rising from 12 % to 17 % between 1990 and 2024.

While transport sector emissions in the G20 have remained almost stable over the last decade, their source has shifted. In 1990, the G7 were responsible for 74 % of emissions from the group. This share fell to 56 % by 2015, and declined even further, to 53 %, by 2024. Conversely, the BRICS+ group has increased its share of emissions, accounting for more than a third of the G20’s emissions in 2024 (see Figure 4). Nevertheless, GDP has been growing faster than emissions, leading to a decrease in the emissions intensity of GDP. This is true of all G20 subgroups, but BRICS+ members of the G20 are decoupling emissions from GDP growth faster than others, while also starting from lower initial levels (see Figure 5).

1.3 Vehicle electrification is expanding in all G20 countries, with low-carbon power generation growing even faster

In 2015, electrification was still a niche technology globally. Only 730,000 fully electric cars, 100,000 buses, and 18,000 trucks were on the road. A decade later, the number of electric cars had grown to 39 million worldwide – an astonishing increase of over 5,000 %. Most of this growth occurred in G20 countries (see Figure 6). The largest growth market in the G20 is China: Between 2015 and 2024, China increased its share of electric cars in the total fleet from 0.2 % to 11 %. Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, France and Canada followed with increases of four to six percentage points over the same period. All other G20 countries progressed much more slowly in their efforts to electrify their car fleets (see Figure 7).

The electrification of vehicle fleets is a crucial element of transport-sector decarbonisation. Electric vehicles are more energy efficient than cars powered by fossil fuels; this efficiency means lower emissions. However, the full potential of electric vehicles can only be realised if they run on electricity generated with low-carbon technologies. Therefore, it is essential for the electrification of the transport sector and the decarbonisation of power generation to proceed in tandem.

Between 2015 and 2022,² all G20 countries increased their share of low-carbon power generation, albeit at different rates. Italy was the exception, with coal and oil use in electricity generation³ increasing in 2022 due to the energy crisis affecting Europe. Australia, Japan⁴ and the United Kingdom achieved the highest growth in low-carbon power generation. Australia managed to more than double its share of low-carbon power generation from 13 % in 2015 to 31 % in 2022, but lags in electrification, where efforts to electrify the fleet started late compared to other countries. Over the same period, the United Kingdom increased its share of low-carbon power generation from 44 % to 54 %, while almost completely phasing out coal-fired power generation. Japan increased its share of low-carbon sources by mainly restarting previously closed nuclear power plants, but also by increasing its share of low-carbon power generation by 12 percentage points (see Figure 7).

1.4 Road transport continues growing

Replacing combustion-engine vehicles with electric ones is not enough to curb GHG emissions from the transport sector. We need to shift towards more efficient modes of transport, such as buses, rail and water-based transport, to use energy as efficiently as possible. The trend towards individual mobility is evident in all G20 countries, with the notable exceptions of Canada and the United States, where the number of passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants decreased between 2015 and 2023 (albeit from high starting levels). Growth in motorisation is slowing in some of the analysed countries, particularly in those with a higher GDP per capita, such as Australia, France and the United Kingdom. However, even higher-income countries such as Italy and South Korea have experienced significant growth in the number of passenger cars, despite already high initial levels (see Figure 8).

Nevertheless, vehicle ownership represents merely one aspect of the broader issue. The key factor in terms of emissions is how often and how far people drive their own vehicles, and how frequently they opt for alternative modes of transport, such as rail, which is the most energy-efficient form of passenger transport. Analysing the development of passenger transport activity levels for cars and railways since 2015 reveals mixed results.

Most G20 countries continue to rely heavily on cars for passenger transport, with shares above 80 %. Only Japan and China use rail to transport a significant proportion of passengers. Both countries have well-developed rail systems with substantial high-speed capacity. The importance of rail in China has increased significantly over the past decade. In 2015, rail already accounted for 53 % of land-based passenger transport, but rose even further, to 76 %, by 2023. Aside from China, Turkey is the only country to see a lower reliance on cars, but the shift in Turkey is small (one percentage point). All other G20 members maintained or increased their reliance on cars (see Figure 9).

The majority of G20 countries place a similar emphasis on road transport for the purpose of moving goods. Over the past decade, the proportion of goods transported by road has increased in most G20 countries for which data are available, with the exception of China and Germany. In Germany, this is due to a 9 % overall decrease in tonne-kilometres over the period, as well as a 25 % drop in water-based transport. Conversely, China shifted a large proportion of its rapidly increasing freight volumes (which grew 39 % in 2015–2023) to rail and waterways, with coastal shipping accounting for a significant portion of this shift (see Figure 10).

Japan, China and Australia are the only countries that transport less than half of their goods by road. Australia mainly uses its rail system for this purpose, while Japan and China have strong waterborne freight systems. However, as of 2023, the much-needed shift towards more efficient modes of transport remains outstanding. Italy, France and the European Union as a whole are moving rapidly towards more road freight.

Although policies to support modal shift are gaining traction, they are not yet delivering what is needed. All G20 countries now have policies that support a shift to public transport and low-carbon freight logistics, including those that did not have such policies in place in 2015. Some of these policies have only recently been introduced, such as Australia’s National Urban Policy, adopted in 2024, and the Canada Public Transit Fund (CPTF). Indonesia has also recently planned to expand its short-sea shipping network in order to reduce price disparities and shift freight to maritime transport. Due to the lengthy implementation times of public transport infrastructure projects, it will take many years for these policies to have an observable effect. Nevertheless, it is crucial that all countries now have support and expansion plans in place for public transport and low-carbon freight (see Table 1). 

An increasing number of countries are also establishing legal frameworks and support systems for new mobility services, such as shared mobility. These mostly consist of legislation enabling and regulating such services. Measures to support active transport often focus on overarching strategies. Nevertheless, some countries have dedicated budget lines for expanding bike lanes and pedestrian infrastructure. Examples include Australia’s Active Transport Fund, Canada’s Active Transportation Fund, and the United Kingdom’s Cycling and Walking Investment Strategy.

As outlined in section 1.4, however, individual road transport remains prevalent for passengers and freight in most G20 countries. This suggests that the existing measures may have slowed down, but have not yet reversed, the trend, and that further efforts are required to provide appealing alternatives to driving or transporting goods by truck.

3.3 Electrification is a major opportunity for African economies

Africa is the world’s largest market for used vehicles, importing around 900,000 used passenger cars each year. These cars make up 85–90 % of light-duty fleets in most African countries.¹⁵ Between 2015 and 2018, around 40 % of the 14 million used light-duty vehicles exported globally were received by Africa, mainly from the EU, Japan and the United States.¹⁶ At the same time, African countries spend a disproportionately high share of their GDP on imported road fuels – 3.6 %, on average, compared to a global median of 2.1 % – yet transport access remains limited. High fuel import costs push up transport prices and often lead to subsidies that put a strain on public budgets and reduce resources for sustainable transport and development.¹⁷

Figure 14.1 illustrates the proportion of GDP spent on importing gasoline and diesel for road transport in countries across Africa. Libya spends the highest proportion, at 16.1 % of GDP, followed by Mali (9.1 %) and Mozambique (8.8 %). As fuel imports are paid for in foreign currency and are subject to volatile global prices, they put significant pressure on national fiscal resources.

Africa’s abundant renewable energy and mineral resources provide a solid basis for transitioning transport away from imported fuels towards electric and sustainable mobility. In most African countries, petrol vehicles cost around 5.5 times more to operate per kilometre than electric vehicles, reflecting the higher efficiency of EVs and the significant differences in electricity prices. These range from below USD 0.01/kWh in countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia and Libya, to above USD 0.30/kWh in Guinea-Bissau, Comoros and Cape Verde. In contrast, fuel prices vary less in other countries, ranging from below USD 0.40/l in Angola, Algeria and Egypt to above USD 1.50/l in the Central African Republic, Senegal and Zimbabwe. This makes EVs most competitive where electricity is cheap (see Figure 14.2).¹⁸ Focussing on electric mobility can reduce costs, increase access and release strain on tight public budgets.

At the same time, Africa is a key player in the global EV supply chain. It dominates manganese production, with South Africa accounting for 37 % of production and Gabon for 23 %. The DRC supplies 74 % of the world’s cobalt and 14 % of its copper, while Morocco provides around 13 % of the world’s phosphate (see Figure 15).¹⁹ This creates growing opportunities for the continent’s economy, particularly if more of the raw materials can be processed within Africa.

African governments are increasingly adopting ‘produce locally, sell locally’ strategies, making significant investments in basic assembly to move away from importing used vehicles as a first step towards full domestic manufacturing. Various measures, including the bans on used vehicle imports introduced in countries such as Egypt and South Africa, have supported this shift.

Meanwhile, countries such as Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda are increasing local production by setting up Semi-Knocked Down and Complete Knocked Down vehicle assembly plants. Uganda’s state-owned Kiira Motors has been producing electric vehicles since 2011, and BasiGo in Kenya has established an assembly facility with the capacity to produce up to 30 electric buses per year. At the same time, major manufacturers such as BYD and Ford are entering the market with plans to set up local assembly plants. The East African region is emerging as a hub for the assembly of electric vehicles (EVs), including two- and three-wheelers, buses, and passenger cars.

3.4 Ambition and action on electrification are increasing

In developing countries and emerging economies, the NDC process plays a key role for demonstrating national climate ambitions and for attracting international financial and technical support. In their latest NDCs, African countries have identified electric mobility as a key means of achieving climate-neutral transport and mobility.

African nations comprised 26 of the 102 countries that had submitted third-round Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) by mid-December 2025. Among submissions from African nations, 13 contain targets for the expansion of electric mobility. This represents a significant step forward by African countries in formal climate planning, as the vast majority of African NDCs that contain EV commitments exhibit ambition that was absent from the previous round of submissions. This indicates a decisive shift from general intentions to concrete, sector-specific strategies (see Figure 15).

The pledges from African nations vary in scope and scale, reflecting diverse national priorities. Rwanda has set one of the continent’s most ambitious market-share targets, aiming for 70 % of newly registered buses, cars, and motorcycles to be electric by 2035. In West Africa, Sierra Leone, Côte d‘Ivoire and Liberia are focusing on high-impact segments: Sierra Leone is seeking to deploy 10,000 electric three-wheelers (‘kekehs’) and 100 electric buses; Côte d‘Ivoire is aiming for 5,000 electric two- and three-wheelers and a 12 % share of electric car imports; and Liberia foresees adoption of 6,000 electric two- and three-wheelers. Ethiopia stands out for the ambition of its plan to roll out 500,000 electric vehicles by 2033, complemented by a specific plan for over 2,000 charging stations. Other nations, such as Angola, Mauritius, and Nigeria, are prioritising public and commercial fleets, with targets for hundreds of electric buses or specific percentages for electrifying government vehicles.

This mosaic of commitments demonstrates a clear continent-wide recognition of e-mobility’s role in development and decarbonisation, albeit with strategies tailored to local transport ecosystems and economic capacities.
All NDCs submitted by African nations acknowledge the importance of e-mobility, and at least 21 African nations have adopted specific strategies to accelerate the uptake of electric vehicles, using a variety of policy instruments.East Africa is a leading region for the adoption of electric mobility, with Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda emerging as the continent’s frontrunners. Figure 16 shows the countries that have already adopted or are currently developing national EV policies or strategies.²⁰ Other large national markets, including Ethiopia, Morocco, and South Africa, have seen rising EV sales, although data remain limited and national definitions vary. There is growing momentum for EV adoption in Africa. However, ambition and progress remain uneven, with policies in many countries still in the development phase.

The energy sector plays an extremely important role for the adoption of EVs, as it determines the availability of charging infrastructure (a crucial factor for ease of use) as well as the price differential between electricity and combustion fuels (a crucial factor for EV cost competitiveness). In this regard, African countries are well positioned, as most have substantial renewable energy potential. For example, Ethiopia, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo already generate over 90 % of their power from renewables.²¹ By adopting comprehensive EV policy frameworks and strengthening cooperation, African countries can leverage economies of scale to develop a robust regional EV market.

Accelerating and scaling early progress in electric mobility will require long-term policy certainty and enhanced coordination among African countries. Therefore, coordinated action across the domains of policy design, standardisation, infrastructure deployment and market development is essential to building a resilient, scalable regional electric vehicle (EV) ecosystem.